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Social computing systems collect, aggregate, and share user-
contributed content, and therefore depend on contributions
from users to function properly. However, humans are in-
telligent beings and cannot be programmed to behave; sys-
tem designers must provide incentives to encourage users
to contribute. We explore the behavioral consequences of
one simple incentive mechanism: require users to contribute
a minimum amount of information before they are granted
access to the system. Users with a high marginal cost of
contribution will stop using the system, but users with a
moderate marginal cost will increase their contribution, fre-
quently leading to greater benefits for everyone still using
the system. Additionally, if contributions are collaborative
and build upon each other, then existing contributors are
likely to slightly decrease their contributions, leading to a
more ’equal’ distribution of contributions. We show that
this mechanism often leads to increased contributions, and
provide concrete design advice for using this mechanism in
social computing systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Five of the 10 most visited websites are social computing
systems1, making Internet-scale social computing systems
some of the fastest growing websites right now. Social com-
puting systems collect, aggregate, and share user-contributed
content, and therefore depend on the contributions of users
1http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites, re-
trieved on March 14, 2009. The five social computing systems
are YouTube(3), MySpace(6), Wikipedia(7), Facebook(8), and
Blogger(9).
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to function properly. Not all social computing systems suc-
ceed in eliciting contributions; while Wikipedia has over 2.5
million articles and over 9 million registered users2, its ri-
val Citizendium (which runs the same MediaWiki software)
only has around 20,000 articles and approximately 8,000
registered users3.
Human users are intelligent beings and cannot be programmed
to behave; system designers need to provide incentives to
encourage users to contribute. Users contribute primarily
information to social computing systems, but contributing
information is costly. Contributing requires making the ef-
fort to go to the website and either typing in information or
clicking on information. Contributing also requires time to
enter in the information, which has an opportunity cost: time
that could have been spent on other things. To overcome this
cost, social computing systems need to provide incentives
that motivate users to voluntarily choose to spend their time
and effort contributing.
There are many different ways to motivate users to con-
tribute to social computing systems. For example, del.icio.us,
a social bookmarking website, motivates contributions by
providing easy online access to bookmarks and allowing users
to organize their own bookmarks [17]. Facebook, the pop-
ular social networking system, motivates newcomer contri-
butions of photographs by allowing other users to comment
and by providing numerous examples of their friends contri-
butions [3]. Authors on Wikipedia are encouraged to con-
tribute by having an automated robot suggest appropriate
pages that need work [4]. Users on GlassDoor, a site for
salary comparison data, must contribute information about
their own salary to gain access to the aggregated salary data
of others4. In this paper we analyze a generalization of this
last mechanism for encouraging contributions: a minimum
threshold mechanism. This mechanism is technically sim-
ple: users must contribute a minimum amount of informa-
tion to the system in order to receive access to the informa-
tion from other users. While the mechanism is technically
simple, how users will react is not.
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:
Statistics, retrieved on March 14, 2009
3http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Special:
Statistics, retrieved on March 14, 2009.
4http://www.glassdoor.com/about/learn.htm, re-
trieved on March 16, 2009
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We develop a mathematical model of user behavior and use
it to predict how users of a social computing system will alter
their contributions when the minimum threshold mechanism
is put in place. This type of model allows us to better under-
stand strategic interactions between users; how much Alice
is willing to contribute depends on what and how much is
contributed by others, and their contributions in turn depend
on hers. For example, Ephrati et al. [6] used mathematical
modeling to design a meeting scheduling system that users
cannot manipulate. This method also allows us to explic-
itly generalize our results to a whole class of systems rather
than studying only one specific system, and therefore pro-
vide constructive design suggestions for many similar sys-
tems.
Implementation and testing are also important, but we limit
our current contribution to a theoretical analysis. Behav-
ioral modeling provides a principled foundation for design
that extends across different settings. The predicted user be-
havior, because it involves large numbers of users who have
heterogeneous preferences and whose behavior depends on
the strategic choices of others, is sufficiently complex that it
warrants rigorously derived, testable predictions.
Background on public goods
User contributions to a social media system can be seen as
contributions, in the form of information, to a single shared
information pool. All users of the system have access to
this pool. This shared information pool has the properties of
a public good [16]. In particular, the pool is non-rivalrous
since using the information pool does not materially reduce
the value of the pool to other people. To use a familiar exam-
ple, once National Public Radio broadcasts a program, con-
sumption by one listener does not crowd out consumption
by other listeners. For information, nonrivalry is generally
true because the incremental costs of (digital) reproduction
and distribution are approximately zero, and thus multiple
instances of the information can be “consumed” without “us-
ing it up”.
When public goods are created through voluntary contribu-
tions, they generally have the problem of underprovision:
users prefer to “free ride” and use the public good without
contributing, relying on other people to do the hard work
of creating it [16]. Of course, if everyone prefers to free
ride, then the information pool will not get established in the
first place. We see the free rider problem in social media:
Adar and Huberman [1] found that almost 70% of users of a
popular peer-to-peer system contribute nothing at all. While
Wikipedia has over 9 million registered users, only 166,066
(less than 2%) have contributed effort in the last 30 days5.
Of those who contribute to Wikipedia, 50% do not return
after their first day of contribution [10].
Shared information pools in social media are also commonly
non-exclusive; the information in the system is available to
anyone anytime. The information contained on Wikipedia,
del.icio.us, and Twitter is available for free to anyone with
5http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:
Statistics, retrieved on March 16, 2009
a web browser and a network connection. However, non-
exclusivity is a design choice; social media systems could
technically exclude users from accessing the public infor-
mation pool. This potential for exclusivity opens up new op-
portunities for creating incentive mechanisms. The system
can threaten to exclude users who do not meet specific cri-
teria, and if crafted appropriately, this threat can encourage
users to contribute more to the shared information pool.
Numerous researchers have looked at excludable public goods
as a cost-sharing problem: a group of people who benefit
from a public good need to find an agreeable method of di-
viding the cost of the public good [5, 14]. In general, cost
sharing mechanisms are designed for providing a known,
fixed amount of shared resource, with cost shares allocated
after the size is determined. This is not generally appro-
priate for information pools: rarely is it sensible to decide in
advance how much information is the right amount, and then
to require an individual to contribute his share. Cost shar-
ing also strongly depends on the fact that money is a perfect
substitute for itself; my $10 is the same as your $10 when
funding a bridge, but my information and your information
might not be equivalent. Also, it is difficult to “refund” infor-
mation that has been contributed, making it difficult to im-
plement bidding-based mechanisms like that of Young [18].
Bag and Winter [2] propose one such mechanism. In it, all
users submit a bid containing the amount of money they are
willing to pay and the total size of the public good they want.
The mechanism then chooses the set of users whose bids
contain the amount of money necessary to give everyone in
the set their desired total size of public good. Everyone out-
side of this set is excluded and their money returned to them.
This mechanism might be adapted to use information rather
than money, but we would need to be able to specify the
size and composition of the pool without actually knowing
the information already. This is unrealistic in many circum-
stances, but if it were practical in some settings, this mecha-
nism ha desirable properties: it is efficient, stable, and order-
independent.
Feldman et al. [7] propose a related mechanism that is promis-
ing for some applications: encourage contributions by de-
grading the service quality to users who contribute little. De-
graded service is natural in their context (slower downloads
in a peer-to-peer filesharing system). When service quality
is measurable, controllable and uniformly valuable to users,
degradation might serve as an effective motivation to con-
tribute.
Mechanisms in this general family, including cost-sharing,
degradation of service, and the threshold mechanism we an-
alyze below, are fundamentally related to another familiar
mechanism: pricing with exclusion. One way to create an
encyclopedia is to pay authors to write it, and then provide
access to the information only to those who buy it. A degra-
dation or threshold mechanism requires users to “buy” ac-
cess, but payment is measured in units of effort, or of in-
formation content, but not money. Thus, our mechanism
can be seen as a contribution to an emerging literature on
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non-monetary mechanisms for social provision of shared in-
formation pools. Non-monetary mechanisms are especially
appealing if social conventions rule out the use of pricing,
or if the transaction costs of creating and enforcing a pricing
system would be prohibitive.
There may also be useful non-monetary methods to encour-
age contributions that do not rely on excluding or degrad-
ing access. For example, Rashid et al. [15] took a different
approach inspired by social psychology. They found that
individual contributions on MovieLens can be increased by
displaying how valuable a potential contribution would be
to other users. This builds on their previous work [11] that
found that contributions increased when users are given in-
formation about the uniqueness of a potential contribution.
BEHAVIORAL MODEL
To better understand, and make testable predictions about
how users will respond to a threshold exclusion mechanism,
we developed a mathematical model of user behavior. We
begin with a set of potential users of an information pool.
For simplicity we number these users 1, 2, . . . , N . Each user
i is permitted to choose some amount of information to con-
tribute; we call this amount xi. We assume that there is a
meaningful way for the system to measure the quantity and
quality of relevant information along a single dimension.
Users receive some value from having access to the informa-
tion pool and the information contributed by everyone else.
It is neither obvious, nor trivial for our analysis, whether
users benefit directly from contributing their own informa-
tion to the pool. After all, they already have the information
for their own use. For example, after collecting research on
a topic in a personal notebook or file, why make the effort to
write it carefully for others and transfer it to Wikipedia? On
the other hand, when the information is in the pool, others
may add value to it, to the benefit of the original contributor.
For example, others may correct one’s errors in Wikipedia.
Or, others may add value to a personal photo collection in
Flickr, by adding tags or comments.
To allow for either possibility, we model two types of in-
formation pools. First, informative pools are those in which
information is collected, possibly automatically aggregated,
and then redistributed. Both del.icio.us and GlassDoor are
examples of informative pools. The important feature here
is that the pool primarily functions as a way to aggegrate and
distribute information to its participants. For pools like this,
adding my information to the pool doesn’t increase the value
I receives from the pool because I already knows my own in-
formation. Let x−i = x1 + · · ·+xi−1 +xi+1 + · · ·+xN be
the sum of everyone’s contributions to the information pool
except user i.6 We represent the value of an informative pool
by the function vi(x−i). We assume that this function is in-
creasing and concave; more information is better, but as the
pool gets larger each new piece of information is worth less.
6To focus on our main point, we simplify by assuming that infor-
mation can be measured in constant-quality units, so that it is mean-
ingful to sum xi and xj .
When a user benefits directly from adding her own informa-
tion to the pool because others enhance its value, we call the
pool collaborative. Wikipedia is a collaborative pool; open
source software is another example. We represent the value
from a collaborative pool with the function vi(X) where
X = x1 + · · ·xN is the sum of everyone’s contributions.7
We assume this function is increasing and concave. We en-
compass both models by specifying value as vi(αxi + x−i),
where α = 0 for an informative pool, and α = 1 for a col-
laborative pool. This seemingly small difference leads to
qualitatively different predictions.
Contributing information is not costless. Depending on the
information, and the target information pool, contribution re-
quires time and effort for some or all of data collection, anal-
ysis, drafting, formatting, editing, annotating, and organiz-
ing. It is not material whether these costs are denominated
in money: they are foregone resources. In particular, we are
concerned with the opportunity cost: time used contributing
to an information pool is not available for the user’s most
valuable alternative use of that time. This cost also depends
on the amount of information contributed. We represent the
cost of contributing with the function ci(xi). We assume
that this cost is increasing in the amount of information con-
tributed, since contributing more information generally re-
quires more time and effort. We also assume that this cost is
convex, which means that it gets increasingly more costly to
contribute information the more you contribute.
Combining the above sources of value and costs, we form
a utility function, which is a description of each user’s pref-
erences. In this case, the user can choose xi, the amount
of information to contribute to the information pool, and the
function describes how desirable the outcome is based on
that choice (and the choices of everyone else in the system).
Higher values of the function are more highly desired by the
user, so a user will generally choose the contribution level
that maximizes his or her utility function:
Ui(xi) = vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (1)
This specification is very general and can describe the pref-
erences of a wide variety of users. By making only simple
structural assumptions (e.g. more information is better), we
can apply this model to a large number of users for many dif-
ferent types of social computing systems. This gives us the
power to make general design recommendations that apply
to all social computing systems.
The voluntary equilibrium
We begin by calculating how much information each of the
N users of the system will voluntarily choose to contribute.
In particular, we search for a Nash equilibrium of contri-
butions, which is a level of contribution for each user such
that no individual user will want to change his or her con-
tribution once they learn what everyone else is contributing.
Nash equilibria are a common tool for predicting behavior in
game theory and decision theory because they are stable: if
7Complementarities and substitutions between different informa-
tion contributions may have much richer structure, of course. We
again simplify to focus attention on our main points.
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everyone is making choices that match a Nash equilibrium,
then no one will want to change their choice and equilibrium
will continue.
The Nash equilibrium for this system is different for the
two types of information pools. For informative pools like
del.icio.us, each user’s value from the pool only depends on
other users’ contributions and not on her own contribution.
Therefore, whatever she chooses to contribute will not in-
crease her value from the pool (since she already know her
own information), but will increase her cost. Everyone will
choose to contribute nothing: xi = 0 for all i. In equi-
librium, an informative pool will not contain any voluntary
contributions. We know that many users may still choose to
contribute for personal (non-strategic) reasons; we explore
this further near the end of this paper.
For collaborative pools like Wikipedia, the Nash equilibrium
is more complex. Individuals gain some value from con-
tributing to the pool because, in a collaborative pool, the
sum is greater than its parts. Fixing a typo in a Wikipedia
article might be worthwhile because it improves the quality
of the whole article, or, alternatively, content added to the
pool may be more valuable to the contributor than keeping it
to herself because the contributions of others (complemen-
tary material, comments, edits and corrections) add value to
it.
Let x̄−i be the total contribution in equilibrium from every-
one other than user i. A Nash equilibrium results when,
given this amount contributed by other agents, no individual
agent benefits from either increasing or decreasing her con-
tribution a small amount. Mathematically, all agents will be
simultaneously in a Nash equilibrium if ∂vi(xi+x̄−i)/∂xi =
∂ci(xi)/∂xi for all i with xi > 0.
Not enough information
In 1954, Samuelson [16] pointed out that for public goods
like this, relying on voluntary contributions results in fewer
contributions than we as a society would want. This occurs
because each user’s contribution provides value to all of the
other users of the information pool, but this value is not taken
into account when that user is making his or her contribution
decision.
To formalize this, imagine that there is a “system planner”
who can force users to contribute any amount he wants. How
much should he require each user to contribute? Suppose
the system planner wishes to maximize the total utility for







vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (2)
This maximization balances the value of the information pool
to everyone who uses the system and the cost of contribution
from each person. The system planner will cap contributions
when the additional benefits to everyone are no longer worth
the additional cost to the contributor. In a system with an in-
formative information pool, the system planner will choose
an optimal size of the pool and then assign contributions to
those users with the lowest total cost. For a collaborative
pool the result is similar, but the system planner will as-
sign contributions to everyone whose marginal net benefit
is above a threshold.8
The amount the system planner would assign to a user is dif-
ferent from the amount that would be contributed voluntar-
ily; each user will choose to cap his or her own contribution
when the additional value to himself (or herself) is not worth
the additional cost of contribution. Since the system planner
is concerned with the benefits to everyone, and these ben-
efits are by definition (weakly) greater than the benefits to
any one individual, the system planner will choose higher
levels of contribution than individuals will choose for them-
selves.9 Consequently, the system planner would prefer an
information pool that is larger than the pool that is voluntar-
ily provided; the voluntary pool is underprovided.
Evidence suggests that many social computing systems are
underprovided; for example Adar and Huberman [1] found
that almost 70% of users of Gnutella contribute nothing at
all.
SETTING A MINIMUM THRESHOLD
To combat this problem of underprovision in information
pools, we explore a simple incentive to encourage users to
contribute more information to the shared information pool:
require users to contribute at least a minimum amount of
information to the shared pool before they receive access
to the rest of the information in the pool. This require-
ment is intended as an incentive to induce users to contribute
more; however users are not robots and can make their own
choices. Using this model, we describe users’ reactions to
this incentive mechanism.
We begin modeling this requirement by specifying a mini-
mum threshold t. If a user contributes at least t information,
then they are given access to the information pool. If they
contribute less than t, then they are denied access and can-
not benefit from the information in the pool. In a minimum




vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) if xi ≥ t
−ci(xi) if xi < t
(3)
In order to better characterize differences among users, we
assume that all of the users can be ordered by their marginal
net benefit of contribution. Users with a low marginal net
benefit of contribution will be given low indices, and users
with a high marginal net benefit of contribution will be given
high indices. Mathematically, for any given level of con-
8These results are standard and follow directly from the maximiza-
tion of (2).
9Mathematically, the system planner will choose each xi such thatPN
j=1 v
′
j(·) = c′i(xi). Each user will choose xi such that v′i(·) =
c′i(xi). vi(·) is non-negative, increasing and concave, so the sum
of v′i(·) is always weakly greater than any individual v′i(·). As
ci(·) is increasing and convex, the system planner will raise xi to
compensate. [16]
4
tribution xi, we assume that ∂∂xi (vi(αxi + y)− ci(xi)) =
αv′i(αxi + y) − c′i(xi) is increasing in i for any constant y.
This ordering must be the same for all values of xi. In partic-
ular, this ordering must hold for xi = 1, meaning that users
are ordered by the benefit of contributing the first piece of in-
formation. The user who benefits the most from contributing
one piece of information will have the highest index. Also,
for informative pools (α = 0) this is an ordering based solely
on cost; the user with the highest cost of contributing one
unit of information will have the lowest marginal net benefit
and therefore the lowest index i = 1.
An exclusion equilibrium
When a system enforces a minimum threshold constraint,
users will choose alter their behavior accordingly. Some
users may choose to increase their contributions, and oth-
ers may choose to decrease theirs. In this section we use our
model to derive how users will react to this incentive mech-
anism.
To begin, we calculate user i’s best response given that ev-
eryone else contributes x−i. Define x0i (x−i) to be the level
of contribution that user i would voluntarily choose to con-
tribute if there were no threshold and everyone else con-
tributed x−i. This value is likely to be non-zero for col-
laborative pools like Wikipedia (for the reasons mentioned
above) but will be zero for informative pools like del.icio.us
since users receive no additional benefit from contributing to
the pool.
LEMMA 1. Given the threshold t and everyone else’s con-
tribution of x−i, user i would choose one of three options:
x∗i =

x0i (x−i) if x
0
i (x−i) ≥ t
t if x0i (x−i) < t and vi(αt+ x−i) ≥ ci(t)
0 if x0i (x−i) < t and vi(αt+ x−i) < ci(t)
Proof Sketch (complete proofs available in the appendix):
If the user would naturally contribute above the threshold,
then she will continue to do so. If the user prefers to con-
tribute less than the threshold, then she must decide whether
the benefit of accessing the information pool is worth the
higher cost of contributing enough information to meet the
threshold. If so, she will contribute the threshold; if not then
she will leave the system, not receive access, and contribute
nothing.
Lemma 1 describes each individual user’s best response once
she knows every else’s decision. However, this is insuffi-
cient to predict what will happen in such a system, since
when user i makes her choice, that changes the size of the
pool, which then also might change all of the other user’s
choices. Next, we describe a Nash equilibrium for this sys-
tem: a stable point at which no one wants to change their de-
cision once they see the final size of the pool. In this equilib-
rium, users naturally sort themselves into three groups based
on their marginal benefits and costs. We ordered users such
that users with high net benefits have a higher index i.
PROPOSITION 1. For a given threshold t, there exists a
Nash equilibrium characterized by (i0, i∗) such that users
will choose:
x∗i = 0 if i ≤ i0
x∗i = t if i
∗ > i > i0
x∗i = x
0
i if i ≥ i∗
Proof Sketch: Users with high net benefit — users with
index i ≥ i∗— want to contribute more than the threshold in
any case, and thus will do so. Users with low net benefit —
users with index i ≤ i0 — will find that increasing their
contribution to the threshold level is not worth the increase in
cost. They will stop using the system and contribute nothing.
Finally, the users in the middle with a moderate marginal
net benefits will choose to increase their contribution to the
threshold level in order to continue receiving access to the
information pool.
The exact values of i∗ and i0 will change as t changes. This
equilibrium looks different for the different types of infor-
mation pool. In particular, for informative pools like del.icio.us,
no one will naturally choose to contribute above the thresh-
old. In equilibrium i∗ = N , and everyone either contributes
the threshold or stops using the system.
Because of the threshold, moderate benefit users will in-
crease their contribution and low benefit users will stop con-
tributing and stop using the system. But in collaborative
pools, users with high marginal benefits will voluntarily con-
tribute above the threshold. These users are contributing in
order to “top off” the pool; they make the pool slightly larger
because they benefit from the interactions between their con-
tributed information and the rest of the pool. As the pool gets
larger, these users won’t need to contribute as much to get a
desirable size of pool:
LEMMA 2. In a collaborative information pool, every-
one who voluntarily contributes greater than twill alter their
contribution in exactly the opposite direction as the overall
change in the size of the information pool.
Proof Sketch: By assumption, the value from the in-
formation pool is concave, which means that a user values
each additional piece of information in the pool less and less
as the pool gets larger. When one user observes others in-
creasing their contributions, she will value contributions to
the pool slightly less, and will correspondingly slightly de-
crease her contribution to lower her cost of contributing.
Will it work?
Some users increase their contribution and other users de-
crease their contribution, but it is not clear which group is
larger. Does setting a minimum threshold actually lead to
more contributions and a larger information pool? A very
low threshold won’t cause many new contributions but might
drive people away. A very high threshold will drive many
users away but the ones that remain will all be contributing
lots of information.
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Setting a threshold has a larger effect on systems with many
users. Since everyone must contribute the threshold, more
users means more people have increased their contributions,
leading to a larger information pool. Therefore, using a min-
imum threshold makes the most sense on large-scale internet-
based social computing systems.
PROPOSITION 2. If t is less than some maximum t̄, then
as long as the user populationN is large enough there exists
a Nash Equilibrium in which everyone contributes at least t
information to the pool. Furthermore, if the pool is an infor-
mative pool, everyone is better off than without a threshold.
If the pool is a collaborative pool, welfare improves as long
as the voluntarily contributed pool is sufficiently small.
Proof Sketch: Consider the situation in which every-
one contributes t information to the pool. Everyone benefits
from access to a pool of information (sizeNt if it is an infor-
mative pool, and larger for a collaborative pool). However,
there is a strong individual incentive to deviate; most users
would rather contribute nothing (to reduce their costs) and
free ride on the contributions of others. The threat of ex-
clusion works here as long as N is large enough. Larger N
means a larger and hence more valuable information pool,
and being excluded from this pool is a more substantial loss.
However, at some point, having more information in the pool
doesn’t help and the value from the pool is at a maximum. If
the cost of contributing t is greater than this maximum, then
further increasing the size of the pool won’t convince the
user to contribute t. Therefore, this equilibrium only exists
for small enough thresholds.
For an informative pool, without a threshold all users free-
ride and no one contributes to the pool. The threshold t
serves as a coordinating device, inducing all users to coor-
dinate and contribute exactly t. As long as everyone con-
tributes, everyone is better off when they spend the addi-
tional cost to gain access to the resulting large information
pool.
For a collaborative pool, the voluntarily contributed pool
has some value. A user might be willing to still receive
access to a threshold pool but be worse off overall by be-
ing forced to increase their contribution (and hence, their
costs). However, everyone benefits from these extra contri-
butions. As long as the voluntarily contributed pool is small,
the increases in value to everyone else makes these addi-
tional costs socially worthwhile.
Will it always work?
We showed in Proposition 2 that under fairly general con-
ditions there is always a minimum threshold that increases
total system value for an informative pool. But, for col-
laborative pools we guaranteed the existence of a welfare-
improving threshold only when the total of freely contributed
information is sufficiently small. Can we not show that there
is always some threshold, perhaps small, that increases the
value of a collaborative pool?
In a word, “no”. A minimum threshold is sometimes valu-
able, sometimes not. When the pool size with no threshold
is large, each additional piece of information isn’t worth as
much. Further increasing the size of the pool doesn’t add
much value. Mathematically, this is a result of our assump-
tion that value is concave.
To illustrate why a threshold might not help, suppose there
are two types of users: a large group of ‘readers’ in which
individuals contribute very little without a threshold, and a
small group of ‘writers’ that contributes considerably more
per person. We might call this the “Wikipedia case”. When
a threshold is introduced, the readers will increase their con-
tributions up to the threshold because they want to retain ac-
cess to the pool. These contributions come at a cost; all of
these users now have to spent more time and effort to make
the contributions. However, the pool is already very large
(because of the writers), so the additional contributions from
the readers aren’t worth very much. If there are enough read-
ers who have to pay this additional cost, then overall system
welfare may be lower even though the pool is larger.
We suspect this might be the case for Wikipedia, a resource
to which contributions are high without any threshold. Im-
posing a threshold would inconvenience the vast majority of
users, who currently contribute little or nothing, yet plausi-
bly might not increase the value of the pool much for others.
Indeed, there is likely to be another source of loss: many
users may simply stop using Wikipedia rather than make the
threshold contribution.
This example illustrates design advice from our analysis that
can be applied across many different settings: only consider
using a minimum threshold to increase contributions when
the information pool would be small otherwise.
Adjusting the threshold
Maximizing the size of the information pool is not equivalent
to maximizing its value. Though users benefit from a larger
pool, there is a cost incurred to create it: this tradeoff ensures
that the optimal size is less than the maximal size.
However, user value and user cost are not observable by sys-
tem designers. There is one formal link between pool size
and pool value that may be helpful to system designers: an
increase in pool size is necessary (albeit not sufficient) for
a threshold to increase value. In fact, this relationship holds
for any adjustments in threshold level, providing a pragmatic
check:
PROPOSITION 3. If a system designer raises the thresh-
old t and the total size of the information pool decreases,
then aggregate welfare has decreased. If a system designer
lowers the threshold t and the total size of the information
pool increases, then aggregate welfare has increased.
Proof Sketch: Raising the threshold causes everyone
who is contributing the threshold to incur a greater cost of
contributing. Also, since it causes the total size of the infor-
mation pool to decrease, everyone receives less value from
the pool. Finally, some users voluntarily chose to be ex-
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cluded, which means they are no longer receiving the ben-
efits of the information pool. All of these effects lead to a
welfare decrease. The second statement is the converse; all
of these effects are reversed leading to a welfare increase.
Proposition 3 provides dynamic guidance for setting a thresh-
old. As the system designer changes the threshold, the effect
of that change on the total size of the pool provides hints
about the (unobservable) total system welfare.
Who contributes?
Introducing a minimum threshold changes the distribution
of contributors, and of their contributions. Consider first an
informative pool. From Proposition 1 we know that con-
tribution breadth increases: more users will contribute than
would in a strictly voluntary equilibrium. This is also true
in a collaborative pool; more users will contribute at least t
information than would in a voluntary equilibrium.
We can also characterize the change in contribution depth
in a collaborative pool. Two groups of users reduce the
depth of their contributions: First, those with the lowest
net benefits reduce their contribution to zero and leave the
system. Second, those with the highest net benefit were al-
ready contributing more than the threshold so there is no di-
rect pressure on them to increase their contribution. How-
ever, by Lemma 2, because they benefit from content others
contribute, these users will slightly decrease their contribu-
tions.10 Those in the intermediate range of net benefits in-
crease their contribution to exactly the threshold t.11
One interesting implication of the analysis of contribution
depth is that setting a minimum threshold decreases contri-
bution inequality: low contributors increase, and high con-
tributors decrease, their contributions.
Summary of behavioral analysis
We have found that under rather general circumstances, a
well-chosen threshold can improve the social value of an in-
formative pool. For collaborative pools, the desirability of a
threshold depends on several factors, which complicates the
designer’s task, in ways that the formal analysis can charac-
terize helpfully.
One critical finding is that for an increase in the threshold
t to be an improvement, it is necessary (but not sufficient)
that the total size of the pool be greater at the higher thresh-
old. When an increase in welfare occurs, it is due solely to
an increase in contributions from those who are contribut-
ing precisely the threshold amount (those “bound” by the
mechanism). These users have intermediate net benefits of
10This only happens when the total size of the pool increases. How-
ever, by Proposition 3, no system would want to introduce a thresh-
old if it leads to a smaller pool.
11Formally, there will be some value of i, call it iu, such that for
all users i > iu (high net benefits), contributions decrease, and in
general this will include some users in this intermediate group who
give the threshold amount t. These are users who would freely
contribute more than t, but when a threshold increases the size of
the pool reduce their contributions to t.
contributing. Those with high benefits are already contribut-
ing more than the threshold amount, and they in fact reduce
their total contributions. Those with low benefits leave the
system, thus reducing their (in any case, small) contribu-
tions. One qualitative implication of this result is that for
a threshold to be beneficial, the number of people who in-
crease their contributions to reach the threshold must be suf-
ficiently large compared to the number who exit the system.
Not only must there be a large enough group who are in-
duced to increase their contributions, but the size of the pool
when there is no minimum threshold must not be too large
or a threshold will not be beneficial. The system loses value
from those participants who exit rather than meet the thresh-
old. Those doing the extra contributing are bearing addi-
tional costs to create the larger pool. Therefore, the ben-
efits to those who receive access must be reasonably large
for the overall value of the system to increase. But if the
no-threshold pool size is already large, then the gain will be
modest, and will not offset the additional contribution costs
and the value lost by users who exit.
A related implication is that a threshold mechanism is more
likely to be beneficial if there aren’t too many who opt out.
We have assumed that the cost of letting users access the
pool once it is created is approximately zero. There is al-
ways an increase in social value from letting all users ac-
cess an existing pool. The threshold mechanism excludes
some users to create an incentive to contribute content, but
the value those users would have received from access is a
pure social loss that offsets the value of increased content.
In a social computing service in which much of the value
comes from a large number of low-value users, a threshold
mechanism may be ill-advised, because more value will be
lost from these many excluded users than is gained by the
remaining users.
These findings are very general and apply to many differ-
ent systems, though they are limited by the assumptions we
made in deriving them. One advantage of mathematical mod-
eling is that the assumptions are explicit, so that one can
check if they hold in any given system, and revise or extend
the modeling to obtain testable predictions for those differ-
ing circumstances.
PRIVATE VALUE
Users can receive value from their information in two dif-
ferent ways. First, users receive value from having their in-
formation in the pool because, for example, contributions by
others improve one’s own information, and thus add value to
it; we modeled this value above, and will now refer to it as
the social value. Second, though we have focused on infor-
mation pools, users might receive value directly from putting
their information in the system, independent of any contri-
butions by others. For example, users of del.icio.us value
it in part for its use as a stand-alone, web-accessible per-
sonal bookmarking tool [17]. We call this non-social benefit
from contributing the private value, pi(xi), and assume that
it is weakly concave (and increasing) in the amount of infor-
mation contributed. Note that this value might be zero: for
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example, if a user does not receive any independent benefit
from including their information in the information system.
Recognizing this value in the utility function, optimizing
users will choose xi to maximize:
Ui(xi) = pi(xi) + vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi) (4)
Even if there is no information pooling, or if there are no
other contributors, a user will naturally choose to contribute
some amount of information for its private value.12. We call
this level of contribution x̂∗i , the private contribution.
For an informative pool, there are two possible ways this
private value affects a minimum threshold equilibrium. First,
it is possible that x̂∗i > t; user i might want to voluntarily
contribute above the threshold for purely private reasons. If
that is the case, then user i will contribute exactly x̂∗i .
The other possibility is that x̂∗i ≤ t. In this case, the personal
benefits serve to mitigate some of the costs associated with
contribution. This can be seen by defining a new cost func-
tion ĉi(xi) = ci(xi)− pi(xi). With this, the utility function
then becomes Ûi(xi) = vi(αxi + x−i)− ĉi(xi), which has
the same form as the utility function we used earlier. For all
levels of contribution xi ≥ x̂∗i , this new cost function is in-
creasing and convex but strictly smaller than the original cost
function ci(·). When x̂∗i ≤ t, user i can retain pool access by
contributing t, but now would do so at a lower absolute and
marginal cost. Therefore, with private benefits, more users
will contribute the threshold t and fewer users will choose to
leave the system.
For collaborative pools, there is one additional effect. Users
who already contribute above the threshold will contribute
even more due to the private value. Users who would have
contributed the threshold without private value may want to
increase their contributions above the threshold.
Blocking private use
When a user is excluded, should he also be excluded from
accessing his own private information? For example, if I am
excluded from accessing del.icio.us, should I still be able to
see my own bookmarks? Mathematically, in our model, this
is the difference between an excluded user receiving pi(·)−
ci(·) and the user only having cost −ci(·).
Unfortunately, the answer is “it depends.” If the system gives
all users access to their private contributions even if they are
excluded from the rest of the pool, some users who otherwise
would have stopped using the system will instead use the
system privately. These users will not have access to the full
information pool, but their contributions can still be added
to the pool for the benefit of everyone else. These benefits
to every one can make it worthwhile for a system to allow
12To find the private contribution, delete the social value v(·) and





. It is unique because of the concavity/convexity
assumptions on these functions; c.f. [12].
users to access a private version of the system that does not
include access to the full pool.
However, when the cost of contributing the threshold is very
large, some users who would normally contribute the thresh-
old will instead choose to use the private version of the sys-
tem. These users end up contributing less information to the
information pool, potentially leading to a small information
pool and lower total system welfare. When deciding if a
private version of the system should be offered, system de-
signers need to assess which of these effects is larger: are
the increased contributions from private users enough to off-
set the lost contributions from users who would otherwise
contribute the threshold?
DISCUSSION
There are several practical considerations for applying this
mechanism in a social computing system. Here we discuss a
few of them:
Quality
This mechanism focuses on the quantity of contributions to
an information pool, but often contribution quality is as im-
portant or even more important. A threshold changes the
distribution of contributions and thus might change the dis-
tribution of quality. In addition, if users can choose the qual-
ity of their contribution, a threshold might also (perhaps per-
versely) affect the quality choice contributors make.
First consider the change in the distribution of contributions:
users with low to moderate net benefits contribute more in-
formation than they would voluntarily. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the cost of contribution is positively correlated with
quality. This might hold because experts have a higher op-
portunity cost (they have better things to do with their time).
If this assumption holds, then using a minimum threshold
will induce more high-quality contributions and might re-
duce the low-quality contributions.
However, if users can choose the quality of their contribu-
tions, then they are likely to choose lower cost (easier) con-
tributions. For example, if del.icio.us required a minimum
number of bookmarks, users bound by this requirement might
simply bookmark the first t websites they find, regardless of
their quality.
Depending on the specifics of the information system, the
designer might employ any of several quality control mech-
anisms. One is to include some measure of quality in the
threshold measurement. For example, Wikipedia could set
a threshold of t edits to articles that are not reverted within
2 weeks. This ensures a minimum quality level for contri-
butions. Another method of ensuring quality is to use a sec-
ondary mechanism that induces higher quality contributions.
For example, Amazon.com asks its users to rate with up to
5 stars the quality of each of its user-contributed reviews. It




To model this mechanism we assumed that there exists a
meaningful way to measure the quality-adjusted quantity of
information contributions along a single continuous dimen-
sion, x. In order to implement this mechanism in an actual
social media system, we do not need a continuous measure
of quantity. A binary measure of whether the contribution
is “enough” — if it meets or exceeds the minimum thresh-
old — is sufficient. For example, the GlassDoor service
doesn’t measure how much salary information a user con-
tributed: if she contributes at all she is granted access to the
site. One implication of our analysis, since we predict that
many users will contribute exactly the minimum necessary,
is that it is important to set the threshold such that the in-
cluding the minimum contribution in the information pool is
actually useful to other users.
Authentication
Excluding users who do not contribute enough depends on
being able to identify them. This usually is done by requiring
that users create accounts before accessing the information
pool. This is an additional cost of contribution, and might
reduce use of the system [9].
Bootstrapping
Another practical problem is the bootstrapping problem: how
does the system react to new users before they have had an
opportunity to contribute? This is important for two rea-
sons. First, social computing systems are often an experi-
ence good; users need to experience the information pool to
know how valuable it is to them so they can make an in-
formed choice. Second, users often learn how to contribute
by mimicking the contributions of others. Without being
able to see others’ contributions, new users will not know the
appropriate social norms and conventions for the system. [3]
For these two reasons, it may be beneficial to implement an
“introductory” period during which users can see and inter-
act with the system without meeting the threshold constraint.
At the end of the period the system can enforce the thresh-
old. With such a practice, authentication is not sufficient:
the system designer must now address the problem of “cheap
pseudonyms” [8]: users who create new accounts with a new
“introductory” periods to avoid the threshold requirements.
USING A MINIMUM THRESHOLD MECHANISM
Even though it is costless to let everyone access an infor-
mation pool and benefit from its contents, we are frequently
better off to use an excludable public goods rule that imposes
a minimum contribution. The reason is simple: without this
incentive, participants will undercontribute, and fully or par-
tially free-ride on the contributions of others. Exclusion is
a knob the designer can turn to adjust the tradeoff between
the benefits of inducing more contributions and the costs of
withholding the value of information from some potential
users.
Because there is an unavoidable tradeoff, not all social com-
puting systems will benefit from using a minimum thresh-
old. Our analysis above characterizes how users will react
to a system which uses this mechanism. We now use this in-
formation to provide concrete design guidance for using the
minimum threshold mechanism. A social computing system
should consider using the minimum threshold mechanism
when:
• There are a large number of users in the system.
• Without an explicit mechanism, users contribute very lit-
tle.
• Having more users contributing is more important than
greater contributions from each user.
When using the minimum threshold mechanism,
• Users with high costs of contributing and low benefits of
access will stop using the system.
• Setting a minimum threshold increases the breadth of con-
tribution — more users contribute — but potentially sac-
rifices depth of contribution.
• Systems with an informative pool will see a greater in-
crease in contributions than systems with a collaborative
pool.
Finally, to use the minimum threshold mechanism,
• Watch the size of the pool as you change the threshold to
know if the change helped.
• Set the threshold so that the minimum contribution has
value to others, since most users will contribute exactly
the minimum.
• Think carefully about whether to allow users to use the
system privately (with access only to their own private
contributions) when they are excluded from the rest of the
system.
Acknowledgment
This material is based upon work supported by the National
Science Foundation under Grant No. CNS 0716196. The au-
thors appreciate helpful comments from audiences at WISE,
the MIT Media Lab, and the MSU Dept. of Telecommuni-
cations, Information Studies and Media, as well as from our
colleagues at the UM School of Information.
REFERENCES
1. E. Adar and B. Huberman. Free riding on gnutella.
First Monday, 5(10), October 2000.
2. P. K. Bag and E. Winter. Simple subscription
mechanisms for excludable public goods. Journal of
Economic Theory, 87:72–94, 1999.
3. M. Burke, C. Marlow, and T. Lento. Feed me:
Motivating newcomer contribution in social network
sites. In ACM Conference on Human Factors in
Computing (CHI), 2009.
4. D. Cosley, D. Frankowski, L. Terveen, and J. Riedl.
Suggestbot: Using intelligent task routing to help
people find work in wikipedia. In International
9
Conference on Intelligent User Interfaces, pages
32–41. ACM Press, 2007.
5. R. Deb and L. Razzolini. Auction-like mechanisms for
pricing excludable public goods. Journal of Economic
Theory, 88(2):340–368, October 1999.
6. E. Ephrati, G. Zlotkin, and J. S. Rosenschein. Meet
your destiny: A non-manipulable meeting scheduler. In
Proceedings of the 1994 ACM conference on Computer
supported cooperative work, pages 359–371, 1994.
7. M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and
I. Stoica. Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer
systems. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, 24(5):1010–1019, May 2006.
8. E. Friedman and P. Resnick. The social cost of cheap
pseudonyms. Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy, 10(2):173–199, 2001.
9. R. S. Gazzale and J. K. MacKie-Mason. User cost,
usage and library purchasing of electronically-accessed
journals. In J. K. MacKie-Mason and W. Lougee,
editors, Byting the Bullet: Economics and the Usage of
Digital Libraries, chapter 6. University of Michigan
Scholarly Publishing Office, Ann Arbor, MI, 2008.
10. L. Jian and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Why leave
Wikipedia? In iConference, UCLA, February 2008.
Extended abstract and poster.
11. K. Ling, G. Beenen, P. Ludford, X. Wang, K. Chang,
D. Cosley, D. Frankowski, L. Terveen, A. M. Rashid,
P. Resnick, and R. Kraut. Using social psychology to
motivate contributions to online communities. Journal
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 10(4), 2005.
12. A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green.
Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, 1995.
13. P. Milgrom and C. Shannon. Monotone comparative
statics. Econometrica, 62(1):157–180, January 1994.
14. H. Moulin. Serial cost-sharing of excludable public
goods. The Review of Economic Studies,
61(2):305–325, April 1994.
15. A. Rashid, K. Ling, R. Tassone, P. Resnick, R. Kraut,
and J. Reidl. Motivating participation by displaying the
value of contribution. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
conference on Human Factors in computing systems,
2006.
16. P. A. Samuelson. The pure theory of public
expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics,
36(4):387–389, November 1954.
17. R. Wash and E. Rader. Public bookmarks and private
benefits: An analysis of incentives in social computing.
In American Society for Information Science &
Technology, October 2007.
18. H. P. Young. Cost allocation, demand revelation, and




Proof of Lemma 1
Since person i’s decision will depend on what everyone else
contributions, we need to first start by making an assumption
about what person i’s expects others to do. She assumes that
others will contribute a total of x−i information to the pool.
Eventually, we will find a fulfilled expectations equilibrium,
which is an equilibrium where everyone decides to choose
exact what is expected. But for now, we are just concerned
with a single person’s choice given their expectations.
First, we calculate what person i would choose if there were
no threshold constraint. In that case, she would choose xi
that maximizes her utility:
x0i (x−i) = argmaxxivi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi)
We call the choice of contribution that maximizes this utility
x0i (x−i). The threshold t is a constraint; if x
0
i (x−i) > t then
person i will happily choose to contribute this amount.
However, if her optimal choice of contribution falls below
the threshold t, then she must either raise her contribution up
to at least t, or she must be willing to forego the benefits of
accessing the information pool. If she chooses to contribute
below t and not receive any benefits from the information
pool, then her utility is simply −ci(xi). Since ci(·) is in-
creasing and positive, the best she can do is to contribution
nothing (xi = 0). If she chooses to contribute xi >= t,
her utility is vi(αxi + x−i)− ci(xi). This expression is de-
creasing in xi for xi ≥ t > x0i by the assumptions on vi(·)
and ci(·). Therefore, the best choice would be to choose
xi = t since that is the smallest contribution that satisfies
the threshold constraint.
Person i’s final choice then depends on how valuable the in-
formation pool is relative to the cost of contributing at the
threshold level. If we assume that the cost of contributing
nothing is zero (ci(xi) = 0), then she should choose to con-
tribute exactly the minimum threshold t if and only if she
would prefer to contribute below the threshold (x0i (x−i) <
t) and the utility from contributing the threshold (vi(αt +
x−i) − ci(t)) is greater than the utility from contributing
nothing (ci(0) = 0).
Proof of Proposition 1
Before we begin this proof, we must first repeat a famous
result from Milgrom and Shannon [13]:
Milgrom and Shannon [13] define a function f(x, i) to have
increasing differences (ID) if for all x′ > x′′, i′ > i′′, f(x′, i′)−
f(x′′, i′) > f(x′, i′′) − f(x′′, i′′). Another way of saying
this is that for x > y, f(x, i) − f(y, i) is increasing in i.
For continuous and differentiable functions, this is similar
and related to the property that the cross derivative is posi-
tive. Milgrom and Shannon [13] were then able to prove the
following theorem:
THEOREM 1 (MILGROM AND SHANNON, 1994 [13]).
If f(x, i) is supermodular in x, and f(x, i) has increasing
differences in (x, i) then argmaxxf(x, i) is non-decreasingin i.
This theorem allows us to describe properties of a user choice
(choosing x to maximize f(x, ·)) as a function of an exter-
nal parameter i. We also use one more simple result from
that same paper that relates more common properties to the
notion of increasing differences:
LEMMA 3 (MILGROM AND SHANNON, 1994 [13]). if
f(x, i) is continuous and differentiable in x, then f(x, i) has
increasing differences if and only if ∂∂xf(x, i) is weakly in-
creasing in i. If f(x, i) is twice continuously differentiable,




We will prove this proposition by calculating a fulfilled ex-
pectations equilibrium. In this type of equilibrium, everyone
forms an expectation about everyone else’s behavior. We
define x̄i to be the expected contribution from user i. Users
will then make contribution decisions based on the expected
contributions from everyone else. We then calculate a set of
contributions x∗i where each person will choose to contribute
exactly what is expected of them (x∗i = x̄i), thus fulfilling
expectations and providing a stable equilibrium.
Before we can prove this theorem, we must prove a couple
of helpful lemmas:
LEMMA 4. The function fj(x, i) = vj(αx + x̄−i) has
increasing differences in (x,i).
Proof: First look at the assumption that users expect
x̄−i ≤ x̄−j for i > j. This is basically saying that x̄−i is
decreasing in i. The first derivative f ′j(x, i) = αv
′
j(αx +
x̄−i) is weakly increasing in i since x̄−i is decreasing in
i, and v′j(y) is decreasing in y (by the concavity of v(·)).
Another way of seeing this is by looking at the continuous
analog: ∂x̄−i∂i ≤ 0, and
∂2
∂x∂i




since v′′j (·) ≤ 0 by the concavity assumption.
Lemma 4 means that vj(αxH + x̄−iH )−vj(αxL + x̄−iH ) ≥
vj(αxH + x̄−iL)−vj(αxL + x̄−iL). This allows us to sepa-
rate the individual value and cost functions from the changes
in expected contributions as i changes.
Given total expected contributions x̄−i from everyone else,
each user iwill choose her contribution to maximize her per-
sonal utility function:
g(x, i) = Ui(x, x̄−i) = vi(αx+ x̄−i)− ci(x)
Now we can state the main lemma that we need to prove this
proposition:
LEMMA 5. If users expect that x̄−i ≤ x̄−j for all i > j,
then g(x, i) has increasing differences.
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Proof: To show this, we must prove that if xH > xL,
i > j then g(xH , i)− g(xL, i) ≥ g(xH , j)− g(xL, j):
g(xH , i)− g(xL, i)
=
(




















vj(αxL + x̄−j)− cj(xL)
)
= g(xH , j)− g(xL, j)
The first equality is by definition of g(x, i). The next line is
a direct result of Lemma 4. The next line is a consequence of
our assumption on the ordering of users; the first derivative
of vi(αx+y)− ci(x) with respect to x is increasing in i and
therefore has increasing differences in (x, i). Finally, the last
equality is by definition.
A straightforward corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 states
that the optimal choice of contribution x∗i is weakly increas-
ing in i. This means that users with a higher marginal benefit
of contribution will voluntarily choose to contribute more in-
formation.
COROLLARY 1. If users expect x̄−i ≥ x̄−j when i > j,
then x∗i is weakly increasing in i.
Finally, to complete the proof we combine Lemma 1 and
Corollary 1. We assume that everyone has identical expec-
tations that users will contribute:
x̄∗i = 0 if i ≤ i0 (5)
x̄∗i = t if i
0 < i < i∗ (6)
x̄∗i = x
0
i (x̄−i) if i > i
∗ (7)
First note that this schedule of contributions is weakly in-
creasing in i: no user i contributes less than any user num-
bered less than i. If users expect each other to contribute
according to this schedule of contributions, then the precon-
dition for Lemma 5 is fulfilled.
Let us begin with line 7. Assume that for some i, x∗i = x
0
i ,
meaning that user i chose to contribute his optimal amount,
which is greater than the threshold t by Lemma 1. Then all
users j > i will also want to contribute their optimal amount




i and the user’s optimal
choice according to Lemma 1 is to contribute xj . Define i∗
to be the smallest i that contributes xi.
Next we move to line 5. If, given the expectations x̄i, no
user will choose x∗i = 0 by Lemma 1, then i
0 = 0. If
at least one person chooses x∗i = 0 then by Lemma 1, we
know that x0i < t and vi(αt + x̄−i)) < ci(t). This last
statement is equivalent to saying g(t, i) < 0. Then all users
j < i will also want to contribute 0: We know that x∗j ≤ x∗i
by Corollary 1 and the only possible optimal choice from
Lemma 1 is x∗j = 0. Let i
0 be the largest i that contributes
exactly 0.
Line 6 is all that is left, and is fairly straightforward now.
Choose an i such that i0 < i < i∗. We know that x∗i ≤ t
since i < i∗. We know that vi(αt + x̄−i) − ci(t) > 0 since
i > i0. Therefore, by Lemma 1, person i will choose to
contribute t.
Proof of Lemma 2
Everyone who contributes greater than t is choosing their
contribution to maximize their utility functionUi(xi, x−i) =
vi(αxi + x−i) − ci(xi). The first order condition for this
maximization states that
αv′i(αxi + x−i)− c′i(xi) = 0





i (αxi + x−i)
α2v′′i (αxi + x−i)− c′′(xi)
This derivative is always negative (since v′′i (·) < 0 and c′′i (·) >
0 by assumption), and furthermore has the same sign for all
i ≥ i∗. Therefore, as the total contribution from other people
(x−i) increases, all users who voluntarily contribute more
than t will decrease their contribution slightly; however this
decrease will not be enough to decrease the total size of the
pool.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let X̄t be the expected total contributions of everyone in this
equilibrium. As long as everyone contributes, we know that
X̄t ≥ Nt, where N is the total number of users. User 1, the
person with the lowest marginal net benefit, will be willing
to contribute t as long as his or her net benefit is positive.
This net benefit is:
U1(t) = v1(αt+ x̄−i)− c1(t) ≥ v1((N − 1)t)− c1(t)
As N increases, the total value to user 1 also increases since





then there will exist an N such that any population size greater
than N will lead to enough value that user 1 is willing to con-
tribute t. By Proposition 1, if user 1 is willing to contribute
t then so are all of the other users, and this is a Nash equilib-
rium.
In an informative pool without a threshold, the dominant
strategy equilibrium is for everyone to contribute nothing,
and consequently the pool will be of size 0. In this equilib-
rium everyone has zero utility since there is nothing in the
pool and no one contributes. In the threshold equilibrium
described above, all users have voluntarily chosen to con-
tribute t, and to do so they must have a net utility that is
greater than 0. Therefore each user has greater utility than
in the no-threshold equilibrium and using a threshold is a
Pareto improvement in welfare.
In a collaborative pool, users will voluntarily contribute some
information even without a threshold, leading to a non-zero
pool sizeX0. User iwas receiving non-zero utilityUi(x0i ) =
vi(X0) − ci(x0i ). Once a threshold is introduced, user i
will have to increase their contribution if they were below
the threshold. Their new utility Ui(t) = vi(Xt) − ci(t)
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is positive because they are willing to contribute, but this
utility may be smaller than the utility they received with-
out a threshold. However, not everyone loses utility upon
the introduction of the threshold; users who voluntarily con-
tribute above the threshold see their utility increase. Sys-
tem welfare, the sum of everyone’s utility, increases when












Since no one has dropped out,Xt ≥ X0. By Lemma 2, users
who contribute above the threshold will voluntarily decrease
their contribution. Therefore, any user who voluntarily con-
tributes above the threshold increases total welfare.
Only users who contribute exactly t can cause a decrease in
welfare (due to the increased costs of contributing t). How-
ever, ifX0 is sufficiently small, then this decrease can be off-
set by the increased value from having a larger pool. Specif-










We know the each element of the summation on the right
hand side is positive since no one has dropped out. The left
hand side is continuous in X0; therefore, there exists a max-
imum X̄0 that makes this an equality. We can ignore the
costs of the voluntary contributions because they just make
this condition weaker (vi(X0)− ci(x0i ) ≤ vi(X0)). As long
as the voluntary equilibrium is sufficiently bad (X0 ≤ X̄0),
then introducing a threshold t leads to an increase in total
welfare.
Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by making two assumptions. First we assume that
the system designer increases the threshold to t from t′ < t.
Second, we assume that this increase causes the total size of
the information pool to decrease, from Xt′ to Xt. We ob-
serve that if t increases but X decreases, then it must be the
case that some users stopped contributing and i0 increased.
Now, we can compute the change in aggregate welfare:
Wt −Wt′ =
∑N
i0 (vi(Xt)− vi(Xt′)) (9a)
−
∑i00


















i )− ci(t′)) (9f)
(Note, only one of (9e) and (9f) will be non-zero, depending
on whether users switch to contributing the threshold from
contributing above the threshold, or vice versa.)
(9a) is negative, and indicates a welfare loss; the value of
the pool to each user decreases because the total size of the
information pool decreases. (9b) is also a welfare loss from
the users who have left the system because of the threshold
increase. (9c) is a welfare loss as everyone who contributes
the threshold has increased their costs due to the threshold
increase. (9d) is also a welfare loss; users who contribute
above the threshold will choose to increase their contribu-
tions to compensate for the decrease in pool size, and this
increase will lead to a corresponding increase in costs. Fi-
nally, both (9e) and (9f) are both negative because whichever
direction the user switches, they do so because it is a higher
contribution, and therefore a higher cost. Since all compo-
nents of the expression are negative, the total change in wel-
fare is negative.
The second half of the proposition can be shown by revers-
ing the direction of the change of both t andX . It is straight-
forward to show that this reverses the sign on everything in
(9a)-(9f) leading to a welfare increase.
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